About Legal Realism
Legal realism [is] an approach that rose to prominence in the 1920s and lasted until the 1940s. Legal realism attacked two fundamental axioms of the traditional, formalist understanding of the common law: that common law legal rules were neutral and objective, and that the rules themselves could be determined with sufficient certainty. Realists maintained that all legal rules were indeterminate in the sense that any articulation of a rule was subject to multiple interpretations. As a consequence, when judges decided cases, they were not involved in an objective exercise of discovering the meaning of some preexisting rule or mechanistically applying a rule to a set of facts (because the indeterminate nature of legal rules conferred discretion on judges to choose from a variety of alternative interpretations), but rather the result would reflect the unstated public policy preferences of the judge. The inconsistent results in the contrasting cases of Re Drummond Wren and Re Noble and Wolf provide an example of the way in which a judge’s predisposition may affect legal out-comes. In essence, legal realism called into question the autonomy of law from broader social and political considerations.
"Legal Theory in Relation to Public Law," Craig Forcese et al in Public Law: Cases, Commentary and Analysis
Legal Realism Key Articles
- A Realistic JurisprudenceLlewellyn, Karl N, “A Realistic Jurisprudence -- The Next Step” (1930) 30:4 Columbia Law Review 431–465.
- Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean PoundLlewellyn, Karl N, “Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound” (1931) 44:8 Harvard Law Review 1222–1264.
- Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave like Human BeingsFrank, Jerome, “Are Judges Human? Part One: The Effect on Legal Thinking of the Assumption That Judges Behave like Human Beings” (1931) 80:1 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 17–53.
- Are Judges Human? Part Two: As through a Class DarklyFrank, Jerome, “Are Judges Human? Part Two: As through a Class Darkly” (1931) 80:2 University of Pennsylvania Law Review and American Law Register 233–267.
- Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional ApproachCohen, Felix S, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach” (1935) 35:6 Columbia Law Review 809–849.
Legal Realism Books
The Bramble Bush by Call Number: This is an ebook.ISBN: 9780195368451Publication Date: 2008-04-15After all these years and many imitators, The Bramble Bush remains one of the most popular introductions to the law and its study. Legal realist scholar Llewellyn introduces students to what the law is, how to read cases, how to prepare for class, and how justice in the real world relates to the law.
Contemporary Legal Realism Books
Research Handbook on Modern Legal Realism by Publication Date: 2021This insightful Research Handbook provides a definitive overview of the New Legal Realism (NLR) movement, reaching beyond historical and national boundaries to form new conversations. Drawing on deep roots within the law-and-society tradition, it demonstrates the powerful virtues of new legal realist research and its attention to the challenges of translation between social science and law.
This is an unlimited user ebook.
